Efficient implementation of optical scanning holography in cancelable biometrics

Fathi E. Abd El-Samie; Fathi E. Abd El-Samie; Rana M. Nassar; Mohamed Safan; Mohamed A. Abdelhamed; Ashraf A. M. Khalaf; Ghada M. El Banby; Osama Zahran; El-Sayed M. El-Rabaie; Abdelnaser A. Mohamed; Ibrahim M. El-Dokany; HossamElDin H. Ahmed; Said El-Khamy; Noha Ramadan; Randa F. Soliman; Walid El-Shafai; Walid El-Shafai

doi:10.1364/AO.415523

Applied Optics
Vol. 60,
Issue 13,
pp. 3659-3667
(2021)
•https://doi.org/10.1364/AO.415523

Efficient implementation of optical scanning holography in cancelable biometrics

Fathi E. Abd El-Samie, Rana M. Nassar, Mohamed Safan, Mohamed A. Abdelhamed, Ashraf A. M. Khalaf, Ghada M. El Banby, Osama Zahran, El-Sayed M. El-Rabaie, Abdelnaser A. Mohamed, Ibrahim M. El-Dokany, HossamElDin H. Ahmed, Said El-Khamy, Noha Ramadan, Randa F. Soliman, and Walid El-Shafai

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Fathi E. Abd El-Samie, Rana M. Nassar, Mohamed Safan, Mohamed A. Abdelhamed, Ashraf A. M. Khalaf, Ghada M. El Banby, Osama Zahran, El-Sayed M. El-Rabaie, Abdelnaser A. Mohamed, Ibrahim M. El-Dokany, HossamElDin H. Ahmed, Said El-Khamy, Noha Ramadan, Randa F. Soliman, and Walid El-Shafai, "Efficient implementation of optical scanning holography in cancelable biometrics," Appl. Opt. 60, 3659-3667 (2021)

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Abstract

This paper presents a new trend in biometric security systems, which is cancelable multi-biometrics. In general, traditional biometric systems depend on a single biometric for identification. These traditional systems are subject to different types of attacks. In addition, a biometric signature may be lost in hacking scenarios; for example, in the case of intrusion, biometric signatures can be stolen forever. To reduce the risk of losing biometric signatures, the trend of cancelable biometrics has evolved by using either deformed or encrypted versions of biometrics for verification. In this paper, several biometric traits for the same person are treated to obtain a single cancelable template. First, optical scanning holography (OSH) is applied during the acquisition of each biometric. The resulting outputs are then compressed simultaneously to generate a unified template based on the energy compaction property of the discrete cosine transform (DCT). Hence, the OSH is used in the proposed approach as a tool to generate deformed versions of human biometrics in order to get the unified biometric template through DCT compression. With this approach, we guarantee the possibility of using multiple biometrics of the same user to increase security, as well as privacy of the new biometric template through utilization of the OSH. Simulation results prove the robustness of the proposed cancelable multi-biometric approach in noisy environments.

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Multi-biometric Images of	Correlation with False Encrypted Composite Multi-biometrics		Correlation with True Encrypted Composite Multi-biometrics
the Tested Datasets	DRPE [47,48]	OSH (Proposed)	DRPE [47,48]	OSH (Proposed)
Encrypted composite image 1	0.2779	0.0592	0.8214	0.8751
Encrypted composite image 2	0.2979	0.0642	0.8780	0.8598
Encrypted composite image 3	0.3364	0.0929	0.7764	0.8511
Encrypted composite image 4	0.2946	0.0358	0.8116	0.8648
Encrypted composite image 5	0.2250	0.0409	0.6342	0.8340
Encrypted composite image 6	0.0128	0.0063	0.6015	0.8535
Encrypted composite image 7	0.2361	0.0788	0.7984	0.8541
Encrypted composite image 8	0.0044	0.01173	0.7923	0.8569
Encrypted composite image 9	0.2689	0.0407	0.7172	0.8470

Cancelable Biometric System	EER	FAR	FRR	AROC
Proposed (OSH)	$8.8567 \times 10^{- 19}$	$2.1356 \times 10^{- 16}$	$1.6528 \times 10^{- 15}$	0.9999
Ref. [8,60]	0.0046	$2.3550 \times 10^{- 04}$	0.9292	0.8837
Ref. [58]	0.0178	0.0017	0.8769	0.8967
Ref. [55]	$5.6942 \times 10^{- 10}$	$3.0414 \times 10^{- 07}$	0.9671	0.9076
Ref. [56]	0.0016	0.1955	$4.5354 \times 10^{- 04}$	0.8737
Ref. [57]	$8.7546 \times 10^{- 09}$	0.0435	$6.1101 \times 10^{- 03}$	0.7187
Ref. [59]	$3.1524 \times 10^{- 12}$	0.0985	$1.6822 \times 10^{- 04}$	0.8630
Ref. [60]	$9.5647 \times 10^{- 05}$	0.0056	$2.5216 \times 10^{- 03}$	0.8684

Multi-biometric Images of	Correlation with False Encrypted Composite Multi-biometrics		Correlation with True Encrypted Composite Multi-biometrics
the Tested Datasets	DRPE [47,48]	OSH (Proposed)	DRPE [47,48]	OSH (Proposed)
Encrypted composite image 1	0.2779	0.0592	0.8214	0.8751
Encrypted composite image 2	0.2979	0.0642	0.8780	0.8598
Encrypted composite image 3	0.3364	0.0929	0.7764	0.8511
Encrypted composite image 4	0.2946	0.0358	0.8116	0.8648
Encrypted composite image 5	0.2250	0.0409	0.6342	0.8340
Encrypted composite image 6	0.0128	0.0063	0.6015	0.8535
Encrypted composite image 7	0.2361	0.0788	0.7984	0.8541
Encrypted composite image 8	0.0044	0.01173	0.7923	0.8569
Encrypted composite image 9	0.2689	0.0407	0.7172	0.8470

Cancelable Biometric System	EER	FAR	FRR	AROC
Proposed (OSH)	$8.8567 \times 10^{- 19}$	$2.1356 \times 10^{- 16}$	$1.6528 \times 10^{- 15}$	0.9999
Ref. [8,60]	0.0046	$2.3550 \times 10^{- 04}$	0.9292	0.8837
Ref. [58]	0.0178	0.0017	0.8769	0.8967
Ref. [55]	$5.6942 \times 10^{- 10}$	$3.0414 \times 10^{- 07}$	0.9671	0.9076
Ref. [56]	0.0016	0.1955	$4.5354 \times 10^{- 04}$	0.8737
Ref. [57]	$8.7546 \times 10^{- 09}$	0.0435	$6.1101 \times 10^{- 03}$	0.7187
Ref. [59]	$3.1524 \times 10^{- 12}$	0.0985	$1.6822 \times 10^{- 04}$	0.8630
Ref. [60]	$9.5647 \times 10^{- 05}$	0.0056	$2.5216 \times 10^{- 03}$	0.8684

Abstract

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Applied Optics